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Abstract  
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine whether the policy recommendations made 
by the European Central Bank in response to the financial crisis of 2008 were biased 
towards fiscal consolidation. It posits that such policies, commonly known as austerity, 
were  underpinned  by  estimates  of  the  fiscal  multiplier  that  were  lower  than  those  of 
international  and  independent  researchers.  To  analyse  this,  it  provides  a  systematic 
overview  of  the  ECB’s  fiscal  multiplier  estimates  by  performing  a  meta-regression 
analysis  on  all  ECB  working  papers  making  multiplier  estimates  published  between 
1992 and 2012, and comparing the results against those of a larger dataset containing 
multiplier estimates made. It finds that the multiplier estimates of the ECB are 
significantly lower than the norm, which is potentially suggestive of bias.  This thesis 
contributes to the literature on ideational bias in economic policy-making by providing a 
systematic literature review that helps inform the discussion on austerity in the EU. It 
also servers as a replication and expansion of previous meta-regression studies on the 
fiscal multiplier, by being the first study that specifically examines the estimates of a 
specific institution.  
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Ever since the outbreak of the financial crisis in late 2007, governments and scholars 
alike  have  fervently  debated  about  the  appropriate  response  to  its  attendant  economic 
problems.  While  during  the  initial  stages  of  the  crisis  many  countries  provided  vast 
amount  of  stimulus  to  mitigate  the  worst  excesses,  most  developed  countries  soon 
turned towards a policy of reducing government expenditure as much as possible. Such 
policies,  commonly  grouped  under  the  label  of  austerity,  were  popular  with  both 
politicians and pundits. Nowhere was this more true than in the European Union (EU), 
where the draconian consolidations undertaken in many of the EU’s weakest economies 
led many critics to decry the European focus on fiscal discipline. 
 
A  turning  point  in  this  discussion  was  a  paper,  first  published  in  the  October  2012 
edition  of  the  IMF’s  World  Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  report,  written  by  then  Chief 
Economist  Olivier  Blanchard  and  Daniel  Leigh.  In  this  paper,  they  contended  that 
austerity programmes may have a much more limited effect, and may even be counter-
productive,  because  fiscal  multipliers  may  be  much  higher  than  previously  expected. 
After this watershed publication, the debate surrounding austerity and the fiscal 
multiplier turned increasingly towards the merits of fiscal stimulus and away from the 
notion of fiscal consolidation as an appropriate policy in many situations.  
 
While  this  publication  would  indeed  lead  to  a  reconsideration  of  the  benefits  of 
consolidation, the initial reception in European policy-circles was less than enthusiastic. 
The response of Olli Rehn, then Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
the Euro, is indicative of the attitude of the EU community to the IMF’s new course. In 
response to the findings of Leigh and Blanchard and the renewed discussion about the 




merits of consolidation, Rehn responded that it “has not been helpful and has risked to 
erode  the  confidence  that  we  have  painstakingly  built  up  over  the  past  years  in 
numerous late-night meetings.” And so while the EU would eventually come to adopt a 
more receptive stance towards stimulus as well, it is clear that this was done reluctantly 
and that austerity seemed more deeply embedded here than elsewhere.  
 
This observation has led to much discussion about the underlying reasons for Europe’s 
dedication to austerity. While many different explanations have been proposed, ranging 
from  the  purely  political  to  the  purely  technical,  a  growing  number  of  scholars  have 
suggested  that  the  preference  may  be  in  part  ideologically  motivated.  This  line  of 
reasoning asserts that policy-making is not just a straightforward and objective response 
to existing problems, but that instead the formation of policy is fraught with potential 
biases.  Policy  is  a  response  to  a  perceived  problem,  so  consequently  policy  will  be 
shaped by the perceptions about the nature, cause and appropriate range of solutions to 
the  problem  that  needs  to  be  remedied.  Especially  with  complex  policy  problems, 
governments  will  rely  on  experts  to  provide  them  with  their  take  on  the  cause  and 
solutions of the problems they are facing. In the case of the EU, the research department 
of  the  ECB  serves  as  one  of  the  primary  sources  for  economic  policy  research.  It 
therefore  plays  a  key  role  in  defining  how  policy-makers  in  the  EU  think  about 
economic issues and the appropriate policy responses.  
 
While there has been a consistent debate stretching back many decades about the role 
that ideas and ideational bias play in economic policy, it has been difficult establishing 
the extent to which this has an impact. This is mainly due to the fact that much of the 
research on this topic has been descriptive and conducted through qualitative research 




methods, which consequently led to issues with assigning significance to the ideas they 
describe.  The  fact  there  is  something  like  a  coherent  set  of  ideas  and  corresponding 
policy  that  can  be  categorised  as  austerity  has  been  well  attested,  but  describing  the 
precise impact this has on actual policy formation has been far more complicated.  
 
The  concept  of  austerity  refers  to  a  set  of  political-economic  terms  describing  policy 
that seeks to reduce budget deficits by reducing government expenditure. Such policies 
can be undertaken for a variety of reasons, such as reducing the debt burden or restoring 
confidence, but many of its proponents also believe that fiscal consolidation causes the 
economy  to  expand  because  government  expenditure  crowds  out  private  investment. 
This  idea  is  what  is  known  as  the  expansionary  fiscal  consolidation  hypothesis.  An 
important characteristic of the internal logical of austerity and expansionary 
consolidation,  therefore,  is  that  the  government  fiscal  multiplier  must  be  negative  or 
low. High multipliers imply that government expenditure has a significant expansionary 
effect  on  the  economy,  and  austerity  can  consequently  only  be  justified  when  such 
effects are limited or negative. As such, examining the estimations that underpin fiscal 
policy proposals is a useful way of examining potential biases that lie at the root of such 
policies. 
 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, there has been renewed interest of the fiscal multiplier 
and  estimations  of  its  size.  There  is  no  true  consensus  on  the  actual  size  of  the 
multiplier, and estimations vary widely. It is indeed difficult to say anything meaningful 
about the true size of the fiscal multiplier, because the multiplier is not a fixed number. 
Instead, it is completely dependant on many different factors, differing over time and 
between places. It has therefore proved difficult to make different estimates comparable. 





Important  new  research  also  indicates  another  important  factor  that  determines  the 
estimation  of  the  multiplier.  Not  just  the  specific  circumstances  of  the  economy,  but 
also the model used for the estimation and the implicit assumptions they make about the 
way  the  economy  functions  have  an  important  impact  on  the  final  estimation  of  the 
multiplier size. Methodology can therefore play a deciding factor in ultimate outcome of 
any estimation made.  
 
The  implication  of  this  is  that  the  penchant  for  austerity  in  the  EU  may  have  a 
methodological  bias  at  its  root.  If  low  or  negative  multipliers  justify  austerity  policy, 
then  the  preference  for  austerity  policy  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  multiplier 
estimates of the ECB were lower than elsewhere. This difference in size can in turn be 
explained by the difference in methodology used in these estimations.  
 
Testing this hypothesis requires a systematic overview of the multiplier estimates made 
by  the  ECB.  Because  the  multiplier  estimate  is  a  concrete  figure,  it  lends  itself  to 
quantitative analysis. A useful method for such a systematic overview that is steadily 
gaining ground in economic research is meta-regression analysis. By performing meta-
regression on all the ECB publications making multiplier estimates, and comparing the 
outcome  to  those  of  previous  meta-regressions  on  the  fiscal  multiplier,  it  becomes 
possible to examine whether the ECB estimates are indeed lower, and if so, whether this 
is due to an overreliance on certain methodologies. To accomplish this I have performed 
meta-regression analysis on a dataset of 147 studies making multiplier estimates 
published between 1992 and 2012, and accounted for which of these were published by 
the ECB.  





The  primary  aim  of  this  thesis  is,  therefore,  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  the  austerity 
policy  in  the  EU  was  informed  by  estimations  by  low  estimations  of  the  multiplier. 
While it is important to note that saying anything meaningful about the true size of the 
multiplier is beyond the scope of this thesis, it asserts that low or negative multiplier 
estimates  provide  a  rationale  for  fiscal  consolidation,  and  that  it  can  therefore  be 
expected  that  such  estimates  may  have  played  a  role  in  shaping  the  EU’s  policy 
response to the crisis.  
 
This thesis will contribute to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it will contribute to 
the literature on ideational bias in economic policy making by providing a quantitative 
analysis  on  a  subject  that  has  previously  been  dominated  primarily  by  qualitative 
research. Specifically, by conducting a meta-regression analysis of the fiscal multiplier 
estimations it allows us to see whether there is a significant difference in the multiplier 
estimates  that  supported  the  EU’s  policy  response  to  the  crisis,  and  whether  this 
difference is caused by methodological factors.  
 
This  thesis  also  contributes  to  the  growing  body  of  work  on  systematic  literature 
reviews in economic research. While this method has become increasingly 
commonplace in academia, this thesis is the first to provide such a systematic analysis 
of  the  fiscal  multiplier  estimations  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  It  will 
therefore serve to inform future discussions on a wide range of topics, such as the fiscal 
multiplier, austerity and economic policy-formation in the EU.  
 




The thesis is structured as follows: It will start with a literature review that is divided 
into three distinct sections. The first of these will give an overview of the discourse and 
attempts made to measure the impact of ideas on economic policy. Specifically, it will 
provide  an  overview  of  the  different  perspectives  through  which  this  topic  has  been 
analysed,  and  it  will  discuss  the  merits  of  qualitative  versus  quantitative  methods  in 
ideational economic research. The second section will be dedicated to the discourse on 
austerity, particularly its trajectory from the academic community into policy circles. It 
will also provide more detail on the interplay between the fiscal multiplier and the logic 
of austerity.  
 
The final section of the literature review will then concern itself with the discourse on 
fiscal multiplier. It will give a definition of the concept of the fiscal multiplier as well as 
an overview of how it has been treated in the academic discourse. Particular attention 
has been given to the way that the policy publications of the ECB have engaged with the 
fiscal multiplier and their estimation of its size. The premise that this section will try to 
substantiate is that the austerity narrative rests on the assumption of low fiscal 
multipliers, and that an analysis of the estimations made by the ECB, and particularly 
the methods they rely on for these estimations, can allow us to glean insight into their 
possible epistemological bias. It will then continue to propose the methodology of meta-
regression as appropriate to examine this.  
 
The  methodology  section  will  then  be  fully  dedicated  to  the  specifics  of  the  meta-
regression analysis. The first part will explicate the basic tenets of the methodology and 
substantiate  why  this  type  of  analysis  is  appropriate  for  this  type  of  research.  The 
second section deals with the methodological issues associated with meta-analysis, and 




outlines the steps that have been taken to overcome then. Following this I will provide a 
detailed set-up of the research, including an overview of the dataset and the variables 
used, as well as give some preliminary expectations. Finally I will supply the results of 
the meta-regression analysis and provide these results with the necessary context to be 





























The first section of the literature review contains a discussion of the literature related to 
discourse on the political power of economic ideas. It will dissect the different ways in 
which  academics  have  attempted  to  measure  the  effect  that  ideas  have  on  policy 
prescriptions. As will become apparent from this chapter, the majority of this research 
has conducted through qualitative methods. While these methods have been convincing 
in their assertion that ideas and narratives do indeed play some role in shaping policy 
outcomes, their descriptive nature has often led to these studies being unable to quantify 
the significance and extent of the role such ideational bias plays. This section will also 
include discuss the relative merit of qualitative and quantitative approaches in analysing 
this phenomenon.  
 
The second section will go on to provide a practical definition of austerity, and trace the 
origins  of  this  narrative  from  their  origins  in  academia  to  their  introduction  as  an 
important epistemological logic in policy circles. An important observation made is that 
austerity  is  not  purely  an  economic  narrative.  It  has  also  been  a  compelling  narrative 
strategy for politicians, and this fact complicates its analysis even further. Because it is 
nigh impossible to separate the political deliberations and economic arguments 
underpinning any given policy, this section will instead propose a shift of focus. Instead 
of providing a descriptive deliberation of bias towards austerity in ECB policy, I will 
attempt to quantify such biases by analysing a related concept that underpins the logic 
of austerity.  
 
The third section, then, concerns itself with this concept, the fiscal multiplier, and the 
discussion surrounding this topic. It will give a definition of the concept of the fiscal 




multiplier as well as an overview of how it has been treated in the academic discourse. 
Subsequently  I  will  focus  on  the  way  that  the  policy  publications  of  the  ECB  have 
engaged with the fiscal multiplier and their estimation of its size. The premise that this 
section will try to substantiate is that the austerity narrative rests on the assumption of 
low  fiscal  multipliers,  and  that  an  analysis  of  the  estimations  made  by  the  ECB,  and 
particularly the methods they rely on for these estimations, can allow us to glean insight 
into their possible epistemological bias.  
 
Additionally  I  will  also  provide  arguments  for  the  supposition  that,  due  to  their 
quantifiable nature, analysing the estimations of the fiscal multiplier allows for 
overcoming some of the limitations of qualitative methods that were previously 
mentioned.  
 
Before  I  begin  the  discussion  proper,  it  is  prudent  to  give  a  primer  on  some  of  the 
terminology  used  in  this  thesis.  In  this  thesis,  terms  such  as  policy-institutions  and 
policy-circles are used interchangeably to mean the collection of different institutions 
(ranging  from  independent  think  tanks  to  universities  to  the  research  departments  of 
government  and  non-government  institutions)  as  opposed  to  policy-implementers  and 
decision-makers  in  the  legislative  and  executive  branch.  In  this  context,  the  Research 
Department at the ECB is classified as a policy-institutions, in that it performs research 









1.1 The Political Power of Economic Ideas 
 
A  foundational  assumption  this  thesis  makes  is  that  ideas  matter.  Policy,  in  its  most 
basic form, is an attempt to address and overcome a perceived problem. While it is true 
that in certain cases the adopted policy is a straightforward result from the material and 
political considerations surrounding the given problem, this is not always the case. This 
is  especially  true  in  situations  where  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  either  or 
both the root-causes of the problem as well as the perception of appropriate solutions. 
What the policy-maker believes, not just about the root-cause of any given problem but 
also the ways in which effected solutions are measured, matters a great deal in shaping 
the final policy response. While this basic premise is easily contended, measuring the 
ways in which, and extent to which, ideas have a tangible impact on policy can be rather 
more difficult.   
 
This  chapter  will  attempt  to  answer  the  following  questions:  to  what  extent  do  ideas 
influence and constrain the policy options of politicians? What are the mechanisms by 
which  such  ideas  are  disseminated  from  the  academic  discourse  into  policy  circles? 
How does one measure the significance and extent of the effect of ideas on policy? To 
answer these questions I will first start with a literature review on the political power of 
economic ideas. I will start with a discussion of Peter Hall’s 1989 book, as one of the 
first serious works on the subjects, before touching on some of the other ways 








Of  particular  relevance  is  Haas’  work  on  “epistemic  communities”,  which  is  a  useful 
framework for analysing the impact that policy circles have on decision-makers. 
Following this, I will discuss the various pitfalls and obstacles that measuring the role of 
ideas entails. In conclusion I will discuss the consequences these insights have for my 
research, as well as propose a strategy to overcome them.  
 
One  of  the  first  comprehensive  discussions  of  the  impact  of  ideas  on  policy  is    “The 
Political Power of Economic Ideas” by Peter A. Hall (1989). This book examines the 
rise  of  Keynesian  ideas  from  academic  circles  into  the  political  mainstream.  At  the 
beginning of this analysis, Hall distinguishes three perspectives through which scholars 
have analysed the impact of ideas: the economist-centred, state-centred and coalition-
centred approach. The economist-centred approach sees the academic community as the 
primary agent in disseminating ideas. Through the discourse, economists discuss 
different ideas, and those that rise to prominence will then be “pushed” onto 
policymakers. In this approach, ideas are primarily seen as tools to help academics solve 
economic puzzles.  
 
The  second,  state-centred,  approach  is  an  institutionalist  approach  that  is  primarily 
concerned with the institutional make-up of policy-making institutes. The ability of any 
given idea to permeate these institutions is dependant on the relative openness of these 
institutions  to  outside  input,  and  the  bureaucratic  capacity  in  turning  new  ideas  into 
policy. Ideas are primarily judged by their ability to solve policy problems.  
 
 




Lastly,  the  coalition-centred  approach  primarily  see  ideas  as  tools  to  forge  coalitions 
and consensus for political actors, and ideas are judged to the extent that they can aid a 
political actor in building coalitions. Hall (1989) argues that any good analysis of the 
impact  of  ideas  should  aim  to  combine  the  prescriptions  of  all  three  frameworks. 
Consequently, for an idea to rise to prominence and have an impact on policy it must 1. 
Be considered an appropriate solution to an economic problem, both to academics and 
to  policy-makers,  2.  Be  able  to  permeate  the  policy-institutions  and  3.  Allow  policy 
makers to build a coalition to implement their policies.  
 
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  the  last  prescription  will  be  mostly  disregarded,  not 
because it is less important than the other two, but because the coalition-based approach 
is outside the scope of this thesis. We are primarily interested in the way that policy is 














1.2 Epistemic Communities 
To  understand  the  interplay  between  economic  ideas  and  economic  policy,  and  to 
underline  the  narratives  can  have  on  the  ways  in  which  policy-makers  conceive  of 
solutions  to  policy  problems,  it  is  worthwhile  to  turn  to  the  concept  of  epistemic 
communities.  Epistemic  communities  are  a  paradigm  that  seeks  to  understand  how 
policy  is  shaped  and  transmitted  to  the  decision-making  level  from  the  academic 
community. Peter M. Haas (1992), who wrote extensively on the subject, defines it as 
follows: an epistemic community is a concrete collection of individuals who share the 
same  worldview  (or  episteme),  or  more  specifically  a  group  of  individuals  that  share 
four distinct characteristics: 
 
1. They share a value-based foundation for the actions of its members.  
2. All  members  of  an  epistemic  community  also  share  casual  beliefs  about  the 
effects and outcomes of policies.  
3. They also share notions of validity, or what constitutes valid knowledge about 
their field of research.  
4. They  also  have  a  common  set  of  practices  associated  with  a  set  of  problems 
towards which their professional is directed.  
 
According  to  Haas,  the  infiltration  of  a  certain  epistemic  community  into  governing 
institutions allows their episteme to directly influence the type of policy that governing 
body produces. Crucial in this process is the notion of uncertainty. Uncertainty here is 
defined as “those under which actors must make choice without "adequate information 
about  the  situation  at  hand"  or  in  the  face  of  "the  inadequacy  of  available  general 
knowledge  needed  for  assessing  the  expected  outcomes  of  different  courses  of  action 




(George 1980)". In such situations where policy-makers do not possess all the relevant 
knowledge to make an informed decision about the preferred policy option taken, they 
will turn to the epistemic communities for guidance. Consequently, the more complex 
and issue, the more influence an epistemic community is able to exert over the policy. 
Haas  did  however  stress  that  questions  pertaining  to  the  mechanisms  of  why  certain 
ideas emerge or change were left unanswered, and it is therefore difficult to 
unequivocally state that ideas are independent rather than intervening variables.  
 
An epistemic community then, is a closed community that shapes the way its members 
conceive  of  policy  problems  and  solutions  for  the  problems  they  are  faced  with,  and 
influence their influence on policy by informing policy-makers at times of uncertainty. 
The greater the uncertainty surrounding a certain problem, the larger the influence an 
epistemic community is able to exert. 
 
Because most economic policy problems are complex by nature, and perhaps none more 
so recently than financial crisis, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the influence of 
the epistemic communities informing the decision-making process was large. Whether 
one can classify the research department of the ECB as an epistemic community is a 
much  more  contentious  matter,  and  one  that  lies  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  In 
reality  there  is  usually  some  degree  of  pluralism  in  every  policy-institution,  and  to 
presuppose  that  there  is  a  consensus  on  all  matters  that  all  researchers  subscribe  to 
would be a severe misrepresentation.    
 
 




Nevertheless, the epistemic community approach provides a good framework for 
demonstrating how a policy-institute can influence the policy-making process, and how 
such a policy-institute can have a homogenising effect on research conducted there. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is merely important to establish that an institution such as 
the ECB could have an epistemic bias that informed the method in which research was 
conducted there. This assumption can then consequently rendered subject to analysis.   
 
1.3 Measuring the Impact of Ideas 
While  the  tangible  effect  of  ideas  shaping  and  constricting  policy  has  become  a 
commonly  accepted  notion,  actually  assessing  the  precise  nature  of  this  effect  is  an 
entirely  different  matter.  According  to  Chwieroth  (2007).,  analysis  of  the  impact  of 
ideas on political outcomes runs into two distinct problems, that is of assigning causal 
weight to the impact of ideas (the “how much” problem) and one of measurement (the 
“how  to”  problem)  Most  scholars  in  the  field  have  circumvented  these  problems  by 
denying them and rejecting the notion of an objective context that can be assessed and 
measured.  Political  scientists  in  particular  have  generally  relied  purely  on  qualitative 
research when analysing the impact of ideas (Chwieroth 2007). Chwieroth argues that 
the  application  of  quantitative  methods  may  help  ideational  researchers  overcome  the 
aforementioned  problems  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  while  evaluating  the  bias-efficiency 
trade off in qualitative research may be quite difficult, quantitative methods can account 
for  it.  This  allows  researchers  to  gauge  the  bias  and  efficiency  gains  of  one  model 
versus another.  
 
 




Quantitative methods also offer the advantage of helping ideational researchers 
overcome objections by sceptics about the importance of social factors for a particular 
outcome. By controlling for other variables included in the model specification which 
presumably  encompasses  all  relevant  variables  that  opposing  theories  suggest  and 
specifying  the  effect  of  varying  a  single  variable,  quantitative  methods  can  provide  a 
means  to  assess  the  causal  weight  of  ideas  net  of  other  factors.  Quantitative  methods 
thus offer precise estimates of how much ideas matter through the parameter estimates.  
 
One particular problem ideational research faces is how to isolate the causal effect of 
ideas on political outcomes and to assign appropriate weight to this factor. Most existing 
research  employ  qualitative  methods  to  address  this  problem,  but  it  has  two  notable 
drawbacks.  One  such  drawback  concerns  the  trade  off  between  bias  and  efficiency. 
Ideally, a researcher aims for a method that is both unbiased and efficient, but since this 
is not always possible, decisions need to be made. King et al argue that it is unclear how 
to  make  such  an  evaluation  for  qualitative  methods,  and  consequently  the  qualitative 
methods used by ideational researchers often tend to overemphasize providing unbiased 
estimates at the expense of efficiency (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:71). 
Quantitative methods, on the other hand, offer the benefit of providing formal estimates 
of  how  much  ideas  matter  relative  to  other  factors  via  the  parameter  estimates.  By 
controlling  in  the  model  specification  for  variables  opposing  theories  suggest  and 
specifying  the  effect  ideas  exert  on  outcomes,  quantitative  methods  can  serve  as  a 
powerful  tool  for  overcoming  the  objections  of  sceptics  (Chwieroth  2007).  Not  all 
questions  concerning  ideational  economics  can  be  answered  satisfactorily  by  using 
quantitative methods, for instance those relating to ideational diffusion and compliance. 




Because of this, it appears that any fruitful analysis of the impact of ideas should strive 
to combine quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
1.4 Conclusion 
As becomes apparent from the above, the main drawback of most attempts to measure 
the impact of economic ideas is that they typically rely on qualitative methods. While 
these  have  been  convincing  in  arguing  for  the  various  ways  in  which  ideas  have  an 
impact on policy, they are much less effective in answering how and to what extent this 
influence occurs. While quantitative methods will potentially lead to far more 
significant results, the intangible nature of the question means that this research has not 
received as much scholarly attention.  
 
One way of overcoming this obstacle is to focus on one a key assumption that informs 
the narrative that underpins the policy recommendations made by the ECB. According 
to the epistemic communities approach, one way in which ideas influence policy is that 
an epistemic community will moderate the way in which its members view the 
appropriateness of a given methodology. In order to assess whether a certain episteme 
has had a tangible impact on policy outcome, it is possible to analyse whether there is 
indeed a high degree of homogeneity in the methodology that the ECB uses, but one 
that  is  not  necessarily  prevalent  outside  of  the  EU  policy  circles.  If  it  is  possible  to 
establish that there is indeed a methodological bias present in the EU policy circles, it 









In the following section, I will provide an overview of the academic debate surrounding 
austerity.  To  this  end,  this  section  of  the  literature  review  has  been  divided  into  the 
following sub-sections: Firstly, I will provide a discussion of the definition of austerity 
and the related concept of the expansionary fiscal consolidation narrative. Secondly, I 
will  discuss  the  origins  of  these  concepts  within  the  academic  literature,  and  outline 
their trajectory from their origin in academic circles to their spread into policy circles. I 
will then discuss the extent to which the EU crisis response can actually be classified as 
adhering to austerity or the expansionary fiscal consolidation narrative. Finally, I will 
draw  attention  to  a  further  concept  that  is  related  to  the  austerity  debate:  the  fiscal 
multiplier. As will become apparent, the fiscal multiplier and its associated discussion in 
the literature may provide a way to assess quantitatively whether the EU response was 
biased towards austerity.  
 
2.1 What is austerity? 
Before we can begin to discuss whether the EU policy response to the recent crisis was 
actually  influenced  by  austerity,  we  need  to  have  a  clear  definition  of  what  we  mean 
when we say austerity. To put it very briefly, austerity here means any policy 
advocating for or undertaken under the premise that reducing government expenditure 
with  the  expectation  of  bolstering  economic  growth.  In  the  words  of  Mark  Blyth 
“Austerity  is  a  form  of  voluntary  deflation  in  which  the  economy  adjusts  through  the 
reduction  of  wages,  prices,  and  public  spending  to  restore  competitiveness,  which  is 
(supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits. Doing so, 
its  advocates  believe,  will  inspire  “business  confidence”  since  the  government  will 




neither  be  “crowding-out”  the  market  for  investment  by  sucking  up  all  the  available 
capital  through  the  issuance  of  debt,  nor  adding  to  the  nation’s  already  “too  big” 
debt.” (Blyth 2013). Such a crowding-out effect is described by pro-austerity advocate 
John Cochrane as follows: “As pro-austerity advocate John Cochrane of the University 
of Chicago put it, “Every dollar of increased government spending must correspond to 
one less dollar of private spending. Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs 
lost from the decline in private spending. We can build roads instead of factories, but 
fiscal stimulus can’t help us to build more of both” (Cochrane 2009). 
 
A  related  concept  that  is  often  used  interchangeably  with  “austerity”  is  the  “fiscal 
consolidation hypothesis”. As  the  name  suggests,  this  hypothesis  assumes  that  fiscal 
consolidation  will  have  an  expansionary  effect  on  the  economy,  and  is  therefore 
functionally the same as what is commonly understood as austerity. In the rest of this 
chapter,  as  well  as  the  remainder  of  this  thesis,  the  two  terms  will  therefore  be  used 
interchangeably. 
 
Now that we have a clear definition of what constitutes austerity, we can next turn our 
attention to the ascendancy of this narrative from the academic fringe into the forefront 











2.2 A History of Austerity 
The fiscal consolidation hypothesis in academic discourse 
 
The  first  charge  for  the  Expansionary  Fiscal  Consolidation  hypothesis  was  made  in 
1990 by Giavazzi and Pagano in their seminal article “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions 
be  Expansionary?  Tales  of  Two  Small  European  Countries”  (Giavazzi  and  Pagano, 
1990). They examined two cases of fiscal stabilization, Ireland and Denmark, and found 
evidence  to  support  the  view  that  fiscal  consolidations  may  have  positive  rather  than 
negative  effects  on  employment  and  growth.  A  second  development  that  undermined 
the  prevailing  logic  of  both  deficit  spending  as  well  as  high  expenditure  was  the 
combined challenge of supply-side economists stressing the negative incentive effects 
of  high  taxes  and  the  contestation  of  the  expansionary  effects  of  budget  deficits  on 
aggregate  demand  (Barro  1974,  1989).  The  consequence  of  these  efforts  was  the 
ascendancy of the idea that governments could neither borrow nor spend their way out 
of a recession. Instead, the prevailing knowledge became that fiscal consolidations were 
actually growth-friendly.  
 
While  this  shift  in  perspective  by  itself  constituted  a  significant  departure  from  what 
was the prevailing wisdom of the time, another development helped cement the 
influence  of  the  expansionary  fiscal  contraction  paradigm  even  further.  As  discussed, 
what matters for an idea to become policy is not just that it is economically feasible; 
effective  ideas  must  also  be  politically  attractive.    And  that  is  precisely  what  another 
article written by Alesina, Perroti and Tavares “The political economy of fiscal 
adjustments” (Spilimbergo, Schindler, and Symansky 2009), found: “We find no 
evidence  of  a  systematic  electoral  penalty  or  fall  in  popularity  for  governments  that 




follow restrained fiscal policies. If anything, the opposite is the case: when deficits are 
reduced, governments that follow a ‘cold turkey’ approach and focus on spending cuts 
may be rewarded at the ballot box. Moreover, cabinets that are willing to cut transfers 
and the government wage bill-traditionally considered the two most politically charged 
components of spending-are not punished by the voters (Alesina et al. 1988) 
Spread to Policy Circles 
During the latter of half of the 1990’s and the beginning of the 21 st century, the ideas 
surrounding expansionary fiscal contraction began to spread from the academic world 
into  the  policy  circles  of  national  and  international  institutions.    In  1996  the  ideas 
featured in several IMF Staff Papers and the OECD Economic Outlook. In 2000 the first 
publication of Public Finances in EMU reported started with the following line: 
“Achieving and sustaining sound positions in public finances is essential to raise output 
and  employment  in  Europe’.  The  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP)  is  the  concrete 
manifestation  of  the  shared  need  for  fiscal  discipline  (European  Commission  2000).” 
During the following decade, the ideas became increasingly embedded in policy-circles, 
including notable publications such as ‘Can fiscal consolidations in EMU be 
expansionary?’  (European  Commission  2003),  Economic Reactions to Public Finance 
Consolidation: A Survey of the Literature (Briotti 2005) Expansionary Fiscal 
Consolidations  in  Europe.  New  evidence  (A.  Afonso  2006),  Lessons  from  Successful 
Fiscal Consolidations (EC 2007), ‘Fiscal consolidations: Lessons from past experience’ 
(OECD  2007),  ‘Fiscal  adjustments:  Determinants  and  macroeconomic  consequences’ 
(Kumar et al 2007), ‘Received wisdom and beyond: Lessons from fiscal consolidations 
in the EU’ (Larch and Turrini 2008). 
 




This literature aimed both at discerning the factors governing successful fiscal 
consolidations  as  well  as  drawing  lessons  from  past  examples.  These  articles  were 
highly effective at framing the debate, leading to a rapid shift in discourse. Where the 
2003 Public Finance in EMU report is concerned with investigating whether 
expansionary fiscal consolidations can be successful, the 2007 report seems to take this 
for  granted  and  is  merely  concerned  with  the  underlying  factors  of  what  makes  such 
consolidations so successful, a marked shift in tone. Larch and Turrini (2008) confirm 
this assessment, stating that at the time of writing, expansionary fiscal contractions are 
now considered to be the received wisdom.  
Something  that  becomes  apparent  when  reviewing  the  literature  is  that  the  debate 
surrounding expansionary fiscal contractions has almost exclusively been conducted by 
economists,  with  hardly  any  reference  to  political  science  research.  As  Gourevitch 
(1986) argued, “policy requires politics”, but the failure of political scientists to 
meaningfully  engage  with  the  debate  has  meant  that  the  political  side  the  debate  has 
been neglected. Because of this, many of the more dubious claims about the political 
expediency of expansionary fiscal contractions have gone unchallenged.  An example of 
this  is  the  omission  of  counter-evidence  on  the  electoral  cost  of  budget  cuts,  such  as 
those  presented  in  Mulas-Granados  (2004)  from  most  policy  publications.  It  appears 
that  most  of  the  evidence  against  the  benefits  of  expansionary  fiscal  contractions  has 
been unsuccessful in penetrating policy-circles. 
 
Another  important  observation  is  that  the  analysis  of  the  conditions  facilitating  fiscal 
consolidations has also been self-serving. To most economists, consolidations are only 
successful under specific conditions. The Irish case, often hailed as the role model of 
expansionary  austerity,  was  only  made  possible  by  “benign  external  conditions  and 




leveraged by key policy interventions, including a sharp devaluation”. It also crucially 
relied on legitimization through social partnership, which is a factor that is often omitted 
from  discussions  in  the  literature.  As  Dellepiane-Avellaneda  (2015)  points  out,  the 
question  of  how  expansionary  consolidations  are  supposed  to  work  under  different 
conditions is one that has not received the proper attention.  
 
2.3 EU Crisis Response 
From “Emergency Keynesianism” to Consolidation 
 
But  no  idea,  no  matter  how  compelling,  can  transcend  the  academic  discourse  and 
permeate the political arena without actually offering a solution to problems perceived 
by  policy-makers.  The  reason  that  austerity  ideas  were  received  so  well  by  policy-
makers is because they offered appealing political solutions to the policy-problems of 
the time. As Giavazzi and Pagano pointed out, “in most European countries, the high 
real  interest  rates  of  the  early  1980s  combined  with  the  large  stock  of  public  debt 
inherited from the 1970s to create a potentially explosive debt problem” (Giavazzi and 
Pagano,  1990).  What  made  expansionary  fiscal  contractions  particularly  appealing  in 
this context is that it claimed to reconcile two conflicting objectives, “austerity without 
pain”,  and  provide  politicians  with  a  narrative  that  allowed  them  to  avoid  political 
backlash while fulfilling their objective of debt-reduction. To conservative politicians, 
expansionary  fiscal  consolidations  provided  them  with  a  vocabulary  to  underpin  their 
ideological  objectives  of  reigning  in  government  expenditure,  and  third-way  social-
democrats could use the narrative to signal economic competence. As such, the 
expansionary-austerity  narrative  increasingly  turned  from  a  solution  to  an  economic 




problem into a powerful discursive weapon for accommodating electoral and coalitional 
imperatives.  
2.4 Conclusion 
While the preceding section provides compelling insight into the discourse on austerity, 
this analysis still remains subject to the same pitfalls that were outline in the chapter on 
ideational  bias.  While  the  case  for  a  comprehensive  set  of  assumptions  that  together 
make up the austerity narrative is solid, it nevertheless runs into problems answering the 
question of the extent to which such ideas actually ended up shaping the crisis response. 
The austerity narrative is not simply an economic one, but also provides a compelling 
narrative political strategy. Considering this, it appears very difficult to assess its impact 
through qualitative analysis.  
 
However, there may yet be a way to assess this impact quantitatively. The key may lie 
in yet another economic concept: the fiscal multiplier. 
 
Simply  put,  the  fiscal  multiplier  is  the  rate  of  change  in  national  income  to  the 
government  expenditure  that  caused  it.  When  the  rate  exceeds  1  there  is  said  to  be  a 
multiplier  effect.  It  is  therefore  fundamental  to  the  austerity  debate,  as  the  austerity 
narrative  necessarily  expects  a  consolidation  of  government  expenditure  to  increase 
economic performance and therefore logically assumes a fiscal multiplier below unity. 
Because  of  this  intrinsic  relationship  between  austerity  and  the  size  of  the  fiscal 
multiplier, it is possible to assess the attitude of the EU policy community towards the 
fiscal multiplier as a pars pro toto of their attitude towards austerity. The advantage of 
such  an  approach  is  that  the  fiscal  multiplier  is  a  quantifiable  figure.  It  is,  at  least 
theoretically,  possible  to  assess  the  manner  in  which  the  ECB  assessed  the  fiscal 




multiplier in its publications and derive some meaningful insight from these estimations. 
Before we arrive at such methodological deliberations, however, we will first need to 
engage with the fiscal multiplier debate in some more depth.  
 
The Fiscal Multiplier 
A  key  concept  that  is  closely  related  to  the  discussion  on  fiscal  consolidation  is  the 
fiscal  multiplier.  Simply  put,  the  fiscal  multiplier  is  the  rate  of  change  in  national 
income to the government expenditure that caused it. When the rate exceeds 1 there is 
what is known as a multiplier effect (Spilimbergo, Schindler, and Symansky 2009). This 
concept and the academic discussion on this subject is closely related to the narrative 
underpinning  the  expansionary  fiscal  consolidation  hypothesis.  Multiplier  estimates 
below unity reinforce the argument for fiscal consolidation, as fiscal stimulus will be 
expected to have a limited effect.  
 
Up until quite recently, a significant part of the literature concerning the fiscal multiplier 
typically regarded fiscal multipliers to be low, and consequently this reinforced support 
for austerity policy. In this section I will provide an overview of the academic discourse 
surrounding the fiscal multiplier during the crisis, particularly focusing on how the ECB 
regarded the fiscal multiplier during this time and its notable disagreement on multiplier 
estimates with the IMF from 2012 onwards. Furthermore, there will be some discussion 
of  the  different  ways  in  which  the  multiplier  can  be  calculated,  and  the  effects  that 
different assumption about the economy have on these methods.  
 
 




Most  of  this  section  will  be  a  descriptive  discussion  of  the  state  of  the  multiplier 
literature, but since the fiscal multiplier is a quantifiable figure, it is possible to review 
the literature from a statistical angle as well. One method that accomplishes this is meta-
regression analysis, and offers a compelling avenue to analyse the multiplier estimates 
of the ECB in further depth.  
 
3.1 The Fiscal Multiplier Debate at the ECB 
In this section I will provide an overview of the way that the fiscal multiplier has been 
treated in research conducted by and for the ECB. This will not be an exhaustive list but 
rather a discussion of some of the more notable publications made that provide some 
insight in what the consensus regarding the size of the fiscal multiplier was at the ECB 
during the crisis. Some attention will also be dedicated to the shift in the discourse on 
the fiscal multiplier that was precipitated by the IMF in 2012, and the way in which the 
ECB responded to this shift.  
 
While the discussion on the fiscal multiplier stretches back decades, there was a resurge 
in interest in the topic after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. One of the first 
treatments of this topic at the ECB was “New Keynesian versus old Keynesian 
government spending multipliers” by Cogan et al (2009). This paper was written as a 
response to findings written in the context of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, which concluded significant fiscal multiplier for the stimulus package. Cogan et al, 
while stressing that the quantitative effects on fiscal policy are quite difficult to estimate 
due to both empirical and methodological problems, found that the fiscal multiplier was 
significantly lower – below unity. Concretely this means that the rate of increase of the 
economy was lower than the fiscal stimulus. 




The  second  relevant  paper  is  “Fiscal  policy  and  growth:  Do  financial  crises  make  a 
difference?” by Afonso et al (2010) which primarily examined the question of whether 
fiscal stimulus and the multiplier had different effects in times of crisis. Using data from 
various countries between 1981 and 2007, they estimated that the fiscal multiplier was, 
on average, between 0.6 and 0.8, which supported the assessment made by Cogan et al 
that the fiscal multiplier was below unity. They were also unable to reject the hypothesis 
that  crisis  spending  has  the  same  impact  as  regular  spending,  which  means  that  it 
remained  uncertain  whether  fiscal  stimulus  during  a  crisis  actually  had  significantly 
higher impact.  
 
The estimation of the fiscal multiplier and the effect of the 2009-2010 spending package 
for  the  Euro  area  were  done  by  Cwik  and  Wieland  (2010).  Following  their  research, 
they concluded that the stimulus would actually have severely detrimental effects on the 
economy  due  to  crowding  out  of  private  consumption.  Instead,  they  advocated  for 
government  savings  packages  (i.e.  fiscal  consolidation),  which  they  argued  would 
provide a significant short-run stimulus and crowding-in of private spending provided 
that such consolidation was given sufficient lead time.  
 
In  its  December  2012  monthly  bulletin,  the  ECB  weighed  in  on  this  debate  and 
responded to some of its criticism it had received regarding the impact of consolidation 
efforts conducted in EU Member States. Primary among those was the IMF’s October 
2012 “World Economic Outlook 2012” (International Monetary Fund, 2012) report that 
suggested  that  the  short-term  fiscal  multipliers  that  were  used  to  generate  growth 
forecasts for the years 2010 and 2011 were systematically underestimated. According to 
the report the real multiplier could be as high as 1.7, a significant difference to the 0.5 




that  was  used  in  the  IMF’s  own  growth  forecasts.  This  publication  constituted  a 
significant shift in the discourse on the fiscal multiplier, and the critical self-reflection 
of the IMF led them to subsequently lessen their support for fiscal consolidation.  
 
The ECB countered this policy shift by referring to the 2012 economic forecast report of 
the  European  Commission,  which  cautioned  against  using  past  forecasting  errors  as 
evidence of the “true size of the fiscal consolidation multiplier” (European Central Bank 
2012). This same report also concluded that the lower fiscal multiplier was consistent 
with the consensus in the empirical literature.  Particularly interesting is the conclusion 
of the bulletin, which implicitly acknowledges that short-run fiscal multipliers may be 
higher,  but  argues  that  the  focus  on  such  short-run  multipliers  is  too  narrow  a  focus. 
Consolidation may lead to temporary economic deterioration, but the improvements in 
the structural balance are permanent.  
 
This  conclusion  does  not  so  much  amount  to  a  defence  of  the  expansionary  fiscal 
consolidation hypothesis – the authors admit that, in the short term at least, 
consolidation will have a negative impact on economic growth – as it is a prioritisation 
of long-term financial stability over short-term growth. The primary argument is then 
that  the  loss  of  economic  growth  due  to  consolidation  is  justified  by  the  objective  of 
reducing debt levels. The outcome of this meant that the European response to the crisis 
was  now  beginning  to  differ  markedly  from  the  preferred  policy  response  elsewhere. 
Where  other  policy  bodies  and  government  were  becoming  more  receptive  to  the 
appeals of fiscal stimulus, the EU remained adamant in their defence of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 




The  next  relevant  ECB  working  paper  gives  supporting  evidence  for  this  policy.  In 
“fiscal  stimulus  in  times  of  high  debt:  reconsidering  multipliers  and  twin  deficits” 
(2013) Nickel and Tudyka use an Interacted panel VAR framework with data from 17 
European countries from 1970 to 2010 to analyse the impact of fiscal stimuli at different 
levels  of  government  indebtedness.  They  conclude  that,  while  the  overall  cumulative 
effect of a spending shock on real GDP is positive and significant at moderate debt-to-
GDP ratios, this effect turns negative as the ratio increases. Their conclusions support 
increased fiscal prudence at high public debt ratios, because in these circumstances the 
effects of fiscal stimuli may be overstated. 
 
Additional  discussion  on  the  relationship  between  the  short-term  fiscal  multiplier  and 
the  medium  to  long-term  impact  of  fiscal  consolidation  on  public  debt  sustainability 
comes  from  Warmedinger  et  al  (2015).  They  conclude  that  there  is  still  considerable 
uncertainty concerning the actual size of the fiscal multiplier. In reviewing the literature, 
they find that while there is a consensus that fiscal multipliers may be large during a 
financial crisis, the negative effects of fiscal consolidations are mitigated when public 
finances are weak. Simulations seem to suggest that any increase in debt-ratio. In this 
context,  they  argue  that  a  “frontloaded”  fiscal  consolidation  is  preferable  even  in  a 
macroeconomic  situation  with  high  fiscal  multipliers,  because  this  reduces  the  total 
consolidation effort and leads to a faster stabilisation of the debt ratio.  
 
In  conclusion,  it  appears  there  has  been  a  nuanced  shift  in  the  appreciation  of  fiscal 
multipliers  in  the  working  papers  of  the  ECB  in  the  last  decade.  While  there  was  an 
initial and persistent under appreciation of the size of the fiscal multiplier, more recent 
papers seem to admit the actual multiplier may be considerably higher.  




Nevertheless, this change in perspective on fiscal multipliers has not led to a change in 
perspective  on  the  benefits  of  fiscal  stimulus.  While  most  authors  contend  that  fiscal 
multipliers  can  be  significant,  especially  in  times  of  crisis,  they  still  advocate  fiscal 
consolidations.  
3.2 Measuring the Fiscal Multiplier  
One striking aspect of the fiscal multiplier literature is that the actual estimates of the 
multiplier vary widely. This is not surprising, given that the multiplier is not static. As 
Caroll (2009) puts it: ‘asking what the government spending multiplier is, [...] is like 
asking what the temperature is. Both vary over time and space”. Multipliers do not just 
vary  from  country  to  country  and  from  time  to  time,  they  are  dependent  on  a  wide 
variety  of  factors  such  as  type  of  fiscal  stimulus,  time  frame  and  expectations  about 
economic  behavior.  In  terms  of  fiscal  impulse  type,  Gechert  et  al  (Gechert  2015) 
identified such types, namely public consumption, public investment, military spending, 
direct public employment, transfers to households and tax cuts. Another conclusion that 
Gechert  et  al  (2015)  arrives  at  is  that  not  just  the  physical  circumstances  will  lead  to 
different multipliers, but that the way in which the multiplier is calculated, the model 
class that is used, also influences the estimation. 
 
The  different  model  classes  that  are  used  to  calculate  the  fiscal  multiplier  all  make 
different assumptions about how the economy works and how agents within it behave. 
These assumptions that are intrinsic to the models have themselves a tangible effect on 
the multiplier estimate. This means that the model class used by any given research will 
have  an  impact  on  the  final  reported  size  of  the  multiplier.  This  is  a  significant 
conclusion, because it means that a preference for a model class may lead to multiplier 
estimates that are significant higher or lower than they would be if a different method 




were used. Before going into more depth about the implications of this, I will provide a 
brief overview of the different model classes that are commonly used to calculate the 
fiscal multiplier. 
 
3.2.1 Model Classes 
RBC 
The  first  model  class  is  the  new  classical  Real  Business-Cycle  (RBC)  model.  Basic 
RBC models assume a utility maximizing, representative household for whom 
Ricardian Equivalence holds. This means that these models are based on the assumption 
that consumers are forward looking and therefore internalize the government’s budget 
constraint  when  making  their  consumption  decisions.  RBC  models  also  assume  fully 
competitive  labour  and  goods  markets.  These  models  imply  a  full  crowding  out  of 
private consumption, and expansionary fiscal policy does not increase GDP through a 
Keynesian  demand  effect,  but  rather  via  a  neoclassical  negative  wealth  effect  that 
results in increased labour supply (Baxter and King 1993). 
 
DSGE-NK 
The second model class, the New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE-NK) model, is the one most commonly used to calculate the fiscal multiplier in 
contemporary studies. They are an extension of the RBC model, adding monopolistic 
competition that produces sticky wages and prices. These additions allow for an output 
gap in the short run and possible demand side effects on fiscal policy even if Ricardian 
Equivalence  holds.  Multiplier  effects  in  these  models  depend  largely  on  the  reaction 
function of the monetary authority, more specifically on the reaction of the real interest 
rate (Gechert 2015a). 




Estimations of the multiplier in these models usually fall in the range of 0 < k < 1 for 
public  spending,  although  current  developments  in  the  literature  tend  to  broaden  this 
range somewhat. This is mainly due to the inclusion of so-called non-Keynesian effects 
due  to  distortionary  taxation,  a  wage-level  increasing  effect  of  public  employment  or 
risk premiums on interest rates for high government debt. 
 
These modifications in these models may imply results that support the idea of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation (Briotti 2005: 10-11). On the other hand, introducing 
a share of non-Ricardian consumers (Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés, 2007) (Cwik and 
Wieland 2010), or a central bank that operates at the zero lower bound (ZLB) 
(Woodford  2011)  (Freedman  et  al.  2010).  DSGE-NK  models  yield  higher  multiplier 
values,  comparable  to  those  of  structural  macro  econometric  models.  These  models 
assume  high  individual  discount  rates  or  liquidity  constraints  for  households,  thereby 
breaking  Ricardian  equivalence.  This  characteristic  is  often  alluded  to  by  multiple 
different synonyms, such as non-Ricardian agents, hand-to-mouth consumers, liquidity 
constrained households etc. In this analysis these are all covered under the heading of 
“Keynesian agent”, because they all share the characteristic of matching their spending 
to their current income. 
 
At the ZLB the nominal interest rate is fixed, and thus expansionary fiscal policy lowers 










The  third  type  of  model  class  is  the  structural  macroeconometric  model  (MACRO). 
While  currently  micro-founded  models  dominate  the  literature,  MACRO  models  are 
still somewhat common in political consulting. MACRO models differ from the 
previous models in that they do not assume utility maximising households, but instead 
estimate macroeconomic consumption and investment functions. These models 
typically  combine  Keynesian  reactions  in  the  short-term  with  neoclassical  features  in 
the long term. Because fiscal multiplier measures are usually short-term in nature, the 
Keynesian  features  of  the  MACRO  models  are  more  prominent  here,  which  leads  to 
multipliers above unity due to a crowding-in effect of private consumption or 
investment dependant on the monetary and foreign trade regime (Gechert 2015a). 
 
VAR 
Another  method  used  in  many  of  the  studies  is  the  Vector  Auto-regression  model 
(VAR).  These  models  measure  the  impulse-responses  of  fiscal  shocks.  Based  on  the 
analysis  of  Gechert,  the  multiplier  estimates  from  VAR  models  vary  significantly, 
which may be due to divergent databases, difference in type of fiscal shock, and the way 
exogenous fiscal shocks are identified. There are five different identification approaches 
for VAR models, two of which rely on additional historic information, and three that 
identify  exogenous  fiscal  shocks  from  the  time  series  directly  (Caldara  and  Kamps, 
2008). Gechert describes the different identification strategies as follows: 
 
 




 “(1) The war episodes approach focuses on a few periods of extraordinary US military 
spending  hikes,  which  are  deemed  to  be  orthogonal  to  business  cycle  fluctuations 
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1998). 
 
(2) The so-called narrative record, established by Romer and Romer (2010) follows a 
similar idea, but employs real time information such as government announcements or 
economic forecasts, and is not limited to military spending.  
 
(3) The recursive VAR approach (Fatas and Mihov, 2001) uses a Choleski 
decomposition with imposed zero restrictions to implement a causal order of the VAR 
variables  and  to  rule  out  contemporaneous  reactions  of  the  fiscal  variable  to  business 
cycle variations.  
 
(4)  The  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002)  SVAR  approach  builds  on  the  recursive  VAR 
approach, but additionally allows for non-zero restrictions such as imposing estimated 
elasticities of automatic stabilizers. 
 
(5) The sign restricted VAR approach (Mountford and Uhlig 2009) identifies exogenous 
fiscal  shocks  by  imposing  sign  restrictions  to  the  impulse-response  functions  of  the 
fiscal shocks and then distinguishing them from a business cycle shock.  
 
Some VAR studies additionally distinguish multiple regimes in order to separate effects 
of  fiscal  policy  in  upturns  and  downturns,  pointing  out  the  relevance  of  downturn 
regimes  when  it  comes  to  evaluating  fiscal  stimuli  (Auerbach  and  Gorodnichenko 
2012). 





The final model class consists of various single equation estimations (SEE), including 
OLS, IV, GMM and ECM approaches. Similar to the VAR model, the estimations from 
these  methods  vary  widely.  Comparing  the  results  from  these  estimations  with  the 
others  may  be  problematic,  because  the  multiplier  estimations  from  these  models 
usually appear in the coefficients of the (lagged) fiscal variables. 
 
As has become apparent, there is no single answer to the question of the actual size of 
the fiscal multiplier, as a wide variety of factors impact the estimation and consequently 
multiplier estimates vary widely as well. There is a considerable body of work 
concerned with reviewing the literature to catalogue the different estimations, but much 
of  this  work  is  descriptive  in  nature,  compiling  a  list  of  the  different  estimations  and 
describing them qualitatively. But since the fiscal multiplier is a quantifiable number, it 
is  also  possible  to  approach  such  a  review  statistically.  Such  an  approach  can  be 
accomplished  by  performing  a  meta-regression  analysis  on  all  the  publications  that 
make multiplier estimates. This allows one to derive stylised facts about the interplay 















The case that this thesis makes is not that low estimations of the fiscal multiplier are the 
sole deciding factor that prompted the countries of the European Union to regard fiscal 
consolidation as an appropriate response to the crisis. A wide variety of different and 
overlapping deliberations and concerns lie at the root of any policy decision, and it is 
outside the scope of this paper to enumerate all of them. What this thesis argues is that 
low  estimations  of  the  fiscal  multiplier  could  have  served  as  a  justification  for  such 
policy. If it is indeed the case that the multiplier estimates calculated by the ECB were 
significantly  lower  than  those  of  other  policy  institutes,  the  ECB’s  tacit  support  for 
fiscal consolidation resulting from these estimations could have had an added impetus 
on  the  fiscal  policy  direction  within  the  EU.  Furthermore,  as  evidenced  by  Gecherts 
research, the outcome of any given fiscal multiplier estimate is dependant on the method 
used  to  estimate  it.  This  conclusion  makes  it  possible  to  analyse  whether  there  is  an 
epistomoligical bias  or  significant  preference  or  overreliance  on  any  single  multiplier 

















4.1 Meta-Regression Analysis 
A primer on meta-regression analysis 
 
A  review  of  the  relevant  literature  is  instrumental  to  any  form  of  academic  research. 
They allow a researcher to get an overview of the myriad views expressed and research 
conducted on a given topic, and allow one to find fertile new ground for new research. 
A recurring problem of literature reviews is, however, one of specification. As Leamer 
and Leonard (Leamer and Leonard 1983: 306) contend:  
“Empirical  results  reported  in  economic  journals  are  selected  from  a  large  set  of 
estimated models. Journals, through their editorial policies, engage in some selection, 
which  in  turn  stimulates  extensive  model  searching  and  prescreening  by  prospective 
authors. Since this process is well known to professional readers, the reported results 
are widely regarded to overstate the precision of the estimates, and probably to distort 
them  as  well.  As  a  consequence,  statistical  analyses  are  either  greatly  discounted  or 
completely ignored (Leamer and Leonard, 1983: 306).” 
Although this problem is well known, for a long time little effort was undertaken 
to remedy or control for such distortions. This is, until the introduction of a more 
systematic  approach  to  literature  reviews  was  designed,  the  meta-regression 
analysis. 
In the words of Stanley and Jarell, one of the first to write an in-depth article on 
the  subject,  meta-regression  analysis  is  “ the  analysis  of  empirical  analyses  that 
attempts to integrate and explain the literature about some specific important parameter 




(Stanley and Jarrell, 2005: 301).” Simply put, meta-regression analysis is the regression 
analysis  of  regression  analyses,  a  quantitative  method  of  reviewing  literature  about  a 
given topic that allows one to control for the influence of several factors, such as model 
specification.  
Meta-regression has been applied in a wide range of different fields, and it has 
also increasingly become a mainstay in empirical economic research. One 
important characteristic of meta-regression analysis is that effect size, which is a 
standard measure of empirical effect, which is assumed to be constant across the 
literature.  
Effect size, as defined by Glass et al. (1981) is usually formulated as follows:  
 
Where µe  is the  mean  of  the  experimental  group, µc  is  the  mean  of  the  control 
group, and σ the standard deviation of the control group. By assuming effect size is a 
constant, one can render the results of highly individualized studies concerning a given 
phenomenon  as  comparable  and  therefore  suitable  for  analysis. This  allows  for  the 
combination  of  a  wide  range  of  disparate  results  and  of  the  analyses  of  the 
processes used to generate those results. This is particularly useful for research of 
an  explanatory  nature,  aimed  at  identifying  determining  factors  of  economic 
phenomena, interrelations between economic phenomena or for the purposes of 
testing a particular hypothesis.  
 




Given this, meta-regression analysis is suitable for this particular research. As the 
objective is to study whether multiplier estimations made at ECB – or rather, the 
methods  used  to  make  those  estimations  –  was  a  determining  factor  in  the 
outcome of the estimations, meta-regression will allow us to do so by making a 
systematic review of the estimations made in the whole of the empirical 
literature. 
 
4.2 Data and Variables 
This section contains an overview of the dataset used for the meta-regression analysis. It 
is  was  compiled  by  Gechert  et  al  for  their  meta-regression  analysis  of  the  fiscal 
multiplier,  and  is  used  here  without  modification  apart  from  an  additional  variable 
indicating whether a study was published by/for the ECB. A detailed description of how 
this variable and its crossproducts for model classes and fiscal impulses were 




The  dataset  used  includes  147  papers  published  between  1992  and  2012  with  a  total 
sample of 2468 observations of multiplier values. Most of these studies were published 
after  2007,  which  is  expected  given  the  resurgence  of  fiscal  policy  as  a  subject  of 
academic  discussion  since  the  onset  of  the  Great  Recession.  The  observations  are 
derived from different multiplier estimation methods: 400 observations using the 
DSGE-NK models, 62 from RBC models, 92 from MACRO models, 1636 from VARs 
and 278 from SEE.  All papers included necessarily either included multiplier 
estimations or enough information to calculate the multiplier independently.   




Variables and Classification 
 
Gechert et al. formulated several characteristics to explain the variability of the different 
multiplier  values,  which  are  derived  from  discussions  in  the  literature.  Of  particular 
importance  are  the  specifications  of  the  type  of  fiscal  impulse  and  the  model  class.  
However,  since  not  every  characteristic  applies  to  every  model  class,  only  those 
characteristics that apply to every model class are included. In the analysis of 
subsamples further characteristics are included.  
 
The  type  of  fiscal  impulse  assumed  by  the  method  of  calculation  is  recorded  on  a 
nominal scale. Each observation must belong exclusively to one value in this group. The 
fiscal impulses used in this dataset are  
 
GSPEND, SPEND, CONS, INVEST, MILIT, TRANS, EMPLOY, TAX 
 
SPEND  applies  to  a  situation  in  which  a  paper  reports  the  effect  of  public  spending 
without  specifying  the  type  of  public  spending,  such  as  public  consumption  (CONS), 
public investment (INVEST) or military spending (MILIT). Together these 4 types of 
public  spending  constitute  the  variable  (GSPEND).  The  remaining  fiscal  impulses 
covered  are  transfers  to  households  (TRANS),  public  employment  (EMPLOY)  or 
lowering  taxation  (TAX).  An  additional  variable  was  set  up  for  spending  in  general 
(GSPEND), which consists of the observations from (SPEND, CONS, INVEST, 
MILIT) to serve as a robustness check. 
 
The studies were further divided by indicating the model class specification used by the 
study.  The  different  model  classes  are  described  in  detail  in  section  3.2.  Since  a 




multiplier  observation  must  exclusively  belong  to  only  one  model  class,  they  are 
grouped according to these values (RBC, DSGE-NK, MACRO, VAR, SEE), so that a 
given  observation  from  a  VAR  method  has  dummies  that  read  (RBC,  DSGE-NK, 
MACRO,  VAR,  SEE).  For  example,  an  observation  that  stems  from  a  VAR  has 
dummies (RBC=0, DSGE-NK=0, MACRO=0, VAR=1, SEE=0).   
 
The  dataset  also  include  several  control  variables.  Multipliers  are  calculated  either  as 
the peak response of GDP with respect to 6 the initial fiscal impulse or as the integral of 
the  response  function  of  GDP  divided  by  the  integral  of  the  fiscal  impulse  or  as  the 
impact response divided by the impact impulse. For this reason, a control variable for 
peak (PEAK) and cumulative (CUM) is also included. Furthermore, research also shows 
the multiplier calculations differ concerning the time horizon of measurement. Because 
peak multipliers are usually recorded on a shorter horizon than cumulative multipliers, 
by  adding  a  variable  (HORIZON)  measured  in  quarters  after  the  fiscal  shock  we  can 
account for this difference in timing and separate it from the method specific effect. 
 
In addition to the variables devised by Gechert, this meta-regression analysis adds a key 
additional variable. As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this research is to analyse 
whether there exist significant differences between the general outcomes of the dataset 
as a whole and of the restricted dataset that only includes papers published by/for the 
ECB. Consequently, a variable indicating as much has been constructed and added to 
the database. With this added variable, it is possible to gain insight about the effect of 
studies  published  by  the  ECB  has  on  the  size  of  the  multiplier  estimate.  As  such  it 
becomes possible to examine whether the multiplier estimates of the ECB were indeed 
lower than the norm, and discern whether such a discrepancy can be accounted for by 




methodological  differences.  As  mentioned  previously,  such  results  would  say  little 
about the actual size of the multiplier, as meta-regression analysis is not suitable to say 
anything meaningful on this subject, but it will provide insight into the estimates that 
underpinned the policy recommendations of the ECB.   
 
This variable was constructed by indexing the studies included in the dataset according 
to whether they were published by the ECB in their working paper or occasional paper 
series or referenced as a source in any substantive ECB publication. This was 
accomplished by using the online database of ECB publications. In total, 300 
publications  were  found  to  belong  to  this  category,  with  52  of  the  samples  estimated 
with DSGE_NK, 23 samples with MACRO, 223 with VAR, 2 with SEE and no samples 
















4.3 Methodological Issues 
 
There  are  certain  methodological  issues  associated  with  meta-regression  analysis  that 
need to be addressed. As mentions previously, a premise of meta-regression analysis is 
the normalization of effect size. For the purposes of this study, normalization is not an 
issue  since  the  fiscal  multiplier  is  already  dimensionless.  However,  as  multipliers  are 
not measured in a standardized way, there still needs to be control for the calculation 
method and time horizon to extract comparable multiplier values.  
 
Another problem with meta-regression is double counting (Goldfarb and Stekler 2002), 
as meta-regression studies should only use distinct observations. When several studies 
use  the  same  dataset  to  estimate  the  multiplier,  you  run  the  risk  of  using  clones  of 
existing  studies.  However,  since  we  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  influence  of  the 
effect of different calculation methods, this is not a problem because the same dataset 
does  not  imply  the  same  calculation  method.  Therefore  these  observations  should  be 
included in their entirety, as they help to discriminate between model specifications.  
 
A related problem is whether to include multiple observations from a single study, as 
for instance when several different models, countries or fiscal impulses are referred to. 
In  these  instances  it  is  advised  (Stanley  2001:  138)  to  use  only  one  observation  per 
study  or  taking  an  average  as  a  precautionary  measure  against  emphasis  of  a  single 
study.  
 
However,  Gechert  outlines  several  arguments  against  this  procedure.  First,  there  is  a 
clear trade-off between variability and degrees of freedom. Furthermore, when selection 
one is faced with the problem of which observation to select. Additionally, while taking 




an average may be suitable for the multipliers, it is not possible to take the average of 
categorical  variables  such  as  the  type  of  fiscal  impulse.  And  while  it  is  true  that  not 
taking an average might give undue weight to a single study that is over-emphasized, 
taking an average has to converse problem of possibly giving undue prominence to non-
comprehensive studies. Because of these reasons, many authors (Gechert 
2015);(Grauwe and Storti 2004); (Nijkamp and Poot 2004);(Card et al. 2010);(Rusnák 
et  al.  2013)  prefer  to  include  multiple  observations  from  a  single  study,  which  is  a 
stipulation this study follows.  
 
Another common practice in meta-regression analysis is to control for publication bias; 
the tendency for researchers to preferentially select results that are statistically 
significant or those that comply with expectations (Stanley, 2008) . Gechert argues that 
they do not expect a systematic preference for significantly positive or negative 
multipliers, since the different methods used all provide varying arguments for a wide-

























4.4 Study Set-up 
 
In order to assess the impact of publication at the ECB on the size of the multiplier, the 
analysis is set-up in the following way. A regression was performed on 12 models, each 
including distinct combinations of variables to account for the influence of each on the 
multiplier. The models are as follows: 
 
- Model  1  and  2  serve  as  the  base  model,  and  are  mostly  a  replication  from
the study conducted by Gechert et al. It includes the variables for the fiscal
impulses  and  model classes,  and  additional  control  variables  for  peak  and
horizon as well as for the regime-type. Model 1 includes the paper dummies
and model 2 does not.
- Models 3 and 4 add the additional ECB variable indicating whether a paper
was published at the ECB. Model 3 includes the paper dummies and model 4
does not.
- Models 5 and 6 include the base model alongside the crossproducts for the
ECB fiscal impulses. Models 7 and 8 include the model class crossproducts
for the ECB papers.
- Models 9 and 10 include specific crossproducts for regime type for the ECB
papers.









The odd-numbered models (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11) are those that include the paper-specific 
dummies.  Because  these  account  for  paper  specific  factors,  they  present  the  largest 
explanatory power and will therefore be refered to primarily in the interpretation of the 
results. The remaining models (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12) are included in the appendix.  
 
The regressions also corrected for some outliers. As the mean of reported multipliers is 
around 0.85, all observations outside the interval [-2; 4] are dropped. This is in line with 
the  study  performed  by  Gechert  and  serves  to  make  the  two  studies  more  readily 
comparable. In total, 62 observations out of a total of 2468 observations were dropped, 



































In this section the main findings of the analysis are presented. Table 1 and 2 provide 
descriptive  statistics  of  reported  multiplier  values  for  the  different  model  classes  and 
fiscal impulses, for the total sample and the ECB papers respectively.  
 
In  general,  the  reported  multipliers  in  table  1  correspond  largely  with  the  findings  in 
Gechert,  with  minor  differences  being  attributable  to  a  larger  sample  size.  General 
spending  multipliers  are  significantly  higher  than  those  reported  for  tax  cuts  and 
transfers. When dividing up spending into non-specific spending, public consumption, 
investment  and  military  spending  it  appears  that  investment  multipliers  are  highest. 
Both deficit and public employment multipliers are considerably lower than the rest. In 
terms  of  model  classes,  highest  multipliers  are  reported  for  the  MACRO  and  VAR 
models. In general, the multipliers for the different fiscal impulses and model classes 
vary widely. 
 
Table  2  outlines  the  reported  multipliers  for  the  papers  published  at  the  ECB.  It  is 
apparent that the multipliers are lower across the board. For the total ECB sample the 
reported mean multiplier is around 0.68, considerably lower than the 0.8 for the total 
sample.  Transfers  and  tax  cuts,  which  were  already  lower  in  the  total  sample,  are 
considerably  lower  still  in  the  ECB  sample.  The  same  goes  for  consumption  and 
military expenditure, while employment is surprisingly higher, about twice the size of 
the  total  sample.  Reported  multipliers  for  the  model  classes  are  consistent  with  this 
change, all reporting slightly lower multipliers with the exception of the SEE models, 
which remain roughly equal.  




Figures  1  and  2  display  histograms  for  each  category.  These  generally  support  the 
evidence from table 2 that multipliers for the ECB papers are generally lower. It is also 
important to note that, in general, neither the results from the total sample nor the ECB 
papers are normally distributed. 
Descriptive statistics 
 









- Total Gspend Trans Tax Deficit
Mean 0.8026 0.93667 0.50499 0.42178 0.35354
Median 0.71 0.9 0.4 0.29 0.211
Std. Dev 0.87089 0.91142 0.61722 0.61709 0.50238
Max 3.9 3.9 2.31 3.7 17880
Min -1.8 -1.8 -1.29 -1.5 -0.4
N 2406 1773 105 449 79
Spend Cons Invest Milit Employ
Mean 0.93646 0.91233 1.1281 0.98394 0.34638
Median 0.875 0.99 1.1 0.85 0.25
Std. Dev 0.79261 0.93751 1.0824 0.94744 1.1786
Max 3.9 3.79 3.88 3.56 3.5
Min -1.7 -1.8 -1.77 -0.64 -1.32
N 831 560 227 97 58
DSGE_NK RBC MACRO SEE VAR
Mean 0.73986 0.5159 1.049 0.8383 0.80902
Median 0.665 0.43 1 0.67 0.75
Std. Dev 0.65089 0.74048 0.47981 0.86423 0.936223
Max 3.9 2.5 2.5 3.7 3.88
Min -0.83 -1.5 0.2 -1.29 -1.8
N 398 61 92 269 1586





Table 2: Descriptive statistics of reported multiplier values for model classes and fiscal 























- Total Gspend Trans Tax Deficit
Mean 0.68717 0.87216 0.27833 0.284 0.24938
Median 0.6 0.8 0.25 0.22 0.2055
Std. Dev 0.78948 0.84555 0.1603 0.56576 0.13209
Max 3.7 3.7 0.49 1.9 0.657
Min -1.75 -1.75 0.1 -1.5 0.074
N 297 206 6 45 40
Spend Cons Invest Milit Employ
Mean 0.9939 0.5635 1.0046 0.1955 0.62
Median 0.9 0.65 1.3 0.055 0.62
Std. Dev 0.80227 0.66049 1.1801 0.43853 0.43841
Max 3.7 1.5 2.665 1.1 0.93
Min -1.7 -1.75 -1.623 -0.25 0.31
N 141 20 23 20 2
DSGE_NK RBC MACRO SEE VAR
Mean 0.69904 - 0.83565 0.85 0.66736
Median 0.66 - 0.87 0.85 0.5285
Std. Dev 0.65924 - 0.45076 0.35355 0.84691
Max 3.7 - 1.62 1.1 3.5
Min -0.5 - 0.2 0.6 -1.75
N 52 - 23 2 220





Figure 1: Histograms of multipliers for various fiscal impulses 






                                                    





























































Figure 1: Histograms of multipliers for various model classes 






























Let us first take a look at the base model. The constant lies around 0.9, and from the 
fiscal  impulses  investment  returns  the  highest  results.  The  other  fiscal  impulses  of 
significance are all negative, with employment being considerably low at -0.8. For the 
model  classes,  SEE  models  return  the  highest  coefficients,  and  RBC  the  lowest.  As 
expected,  peak  multipliers  are  higher  than  baseline  as  well,  since  it  is  based  on 
cumulative, which tends to be lower. All in all these results do not deviate much from 
the findings of Gechert, apart from the employment multiplier. 
 
Model 3 adds the ECB variable to the base model. It is notable that in this model, as 
well  as  all  the  other  models,  the  results  stay  surprisingly  consistent.  There  are  no 
deviations  in  the  results  for  any  of  the  other  variables,  but  the  results  for  the  ECB 
multiplier are remarkable. The analysis suggests that the ECB papers report multipliers 
significantly lower than in the total sample, being negatively significant at -0.8.  
 
Models 5 and 7 distinguish between the fiscal impulses and model classes in the ECB 
papers.  They  largely  confirm  the  findings  of  models  1  and  3  and  there  are  no  large 
deviations. Of the fiscal impulses consumption, military expenditure and deficit 
spending are all negatively significant for the fiscal multiplier. For the model classes, 
















Table 3: Results meta-regressions 
 
 































































































































































































































































Table 3 continued 
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Model 9 largely reports similar coefficients for the ECB papers, but it also highlights an 
interesting  discrepancy.  It  appears  to  suggest  that  low  regimes  in  ECB  papers  report 
significantly  low  multipliers,  which  is  counterintuitive  and  not  in  line  with  either 
conventional wisdom or the findings of recessionary multipliers in the total sample.  
 
Model 11 is a composite of both model classes and fiscal impulses of ECB papers. It 
reconfirms  the  observation  of  the  significant  negative  relationship  between  papers 
published at the ECB and the fiscal multiplier. The negative coefficient is even larger 





















Evaluating  the  effect  that  ideas  have  on  policy  is  no  small  undertaking.  Policy  is  not 
created in a vacuum, and it is not simply a technocratic process but one that is subject to 
many political considerations as well. Nevertheless, the ways in which policy problems 
and their solutions are perceived play a large role in the final policy outcome. As such, 
the  research  conducted  by  the  policy  community  informs  and  shapes  the  array  of 
appropriate policy responses available to policy makers.  
 
The premise of this thesis is that the response of the European Union to the financial 
crisis can be explained, in part, by their perception of the fiscal multiplier.  Austerity as 
an idea requires government spending to have a limited or negative effect on economic 
growth.  As  such,  for  austerity  to  be  a  compelling  policy  the  policy  maker  needs  to 
assume that the fiscal multiplier is small or negative, as high fiscal multiplier provide an 
argument  for  increased  government  spending.  As  such,  the  estimations  of  the  fiscal 
multiplier at the ECB can provide greater insight in the reasons why the EU turned to 
austerity in response to the crisis.  
 
There  is  no  academic  consensus  on  the  actual  size  of  the  multiplier.  Because  the 
estimation  of  the  multiplier  depends  on  many  different  factors,  not  just  on  time  and 
place  but  methodological  considerations  such  as  the  type  of  fiscal  impulse  and  the 
model used to for the estimation, reported multipliers vary widely across the literature. 
While  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  say  anything  meaningful  about  the  true  size  of  the 
multiplier, a systematic review of the literature can provide insight in the ways in which 
these  underlying  variables  impact  the  final  estimation.    Additionally,  it  allows  for  an 
analysis of the multiplier estimates made by a specific institution, such as the European 




Central Bank. Because of this, while it does not by itself provide a definitive 
explanation for the EU’s dedication to budget consolidation, the finding regarding the 
multiplier estimates of the ECB is significant. This study finds that multiplier estimates 
in  ECB  publications  are  significantly  lower  than  those  made  elsewhere.  While  the 
reported multiplier in the total range of publications analysed estimates the multiplier to 
be around 0.9, the ECB publications average around 0.1. This result supports the idea 
that  the  policy  line  advocated  by  the  ECB  was  informed  by  their  estimations  of  the 
fiscal multiplier, and helps explain why the European institutions stayed the course of 
austerity even when the consensus began to shift towards economic stimulus.  
 
Many  scholars  have  made  compelling  arguments  that  the  root  of  austerity  policy  is 
political  in  nature.  While  assessing  this  claim  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  the 
results presented here suggest that policy makers in the EU may have simply believed 
that government expenditure was ineffective in resolving the crisis.  
 
Explaining  this  significant  difference  in  multiplier  estimates  is  harder.  The  analysis 
shows  that  multiplier  estimates  are  lower  across  all  fiscal  impulses  types  and  model 
classes.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  attribute  the  difference  to  a  methodological  bias. 
Nevertheless,  the  findings  documented  in  this  study  should  serve  as  a  foundation  for 
further research in explaining the differences in multiplier estimates between different 
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Appendix 1: Descriptions of Models used in Meta-regression 
 
Model Name Description Variables Included










2 Base Model without
Paper Dummies
Base
3 Base Model with
Paper Dummies and ECB
Base
Paper Dummies
4 Base Model without
Paper Dummies with ECB
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EC
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ECB*RBC - - - - - -
ECB*MACRO










- - - -0,1911***
(-3,0674)
- -
RSW*ECB - - - - - -
RSW1*ECB




- - - - -0768567***
(-3.291)
-
